How Incidental Values From the Environment Affect Decisions About Money, Risk, and Delay by Ungemach, C et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Ungemach, C, Stewart, N & Reimers, S. (2011). How Incidental Values From the 
Environment Affect Decisions About Money, Risk, and Delay. Psychological Science, 22(2), 
pp. 253-260. doi: 10.1177/0956797610396225 
This is the published version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/17970/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797610396225
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
https://doi.org/
Psychological Science
 1 –1
© The Author(s) 
Reprints and permissions: 
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 
www.psychologicalscience.org/PS
Psych logical Science
22(2) 253 –260
© The Author(s) 2011
Reprints and permission:  
sage ub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0956797610396225
http://pss.sagepub.com
Representations of amounts of money, the sizes of risks, and the 
lengths of delays are central to economic decision making. The 
traditional approach to describing decisions involving risk or 
delay is to translate objective amounts of money, risk, and time 
into their subjective equivalents using psychoeconomic func-
tions. For example, in prospect theory, monetary gains and losses 
are translated into their subjective equivalents by a value func-
tion, and probabilities are translated into their subjective equiva-
lents by a weighting function (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; see Starmer, 2000, for a review). In 
delay discounting, delays are translated into subjective weight-
ings (see Scholten & Read, 2006, and Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, 
& Bettman, 2009, for discussions). Once monies, risks, and 
delays are translated into their subjective equivalents, they are 
combined to give overall subjective values for each of the options 
available, with the option with the highest overall subjective 
value being selected. As psychoeconomic functions are assumed 
to be stable within individuals, the subjective values of any given 
monies, risks, or delays—ignoring wealth effects and reference-
point shifts—should also be stable and unaffected by context.
Another possibility is that, instead of preferences being 
derived from stable, underlying psychoeconomic functions, 
preferences are constructed (cf. Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
1992, 1993; Slovic, 1995; Weber & Johnson, 2006). The 
effects of choice-set context in multiattribute choice are well 
established (e.g., Birnbaum, 1992; Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982; 
Simonson, 1989; Stewart, Chater, Stott, & Reimers, 2003; 
Tversky, 1972; Wedell, 1991). Here, we explore the hypothesis 
that subjective values are constructed according to principles 
of relative judgment taken from perception and psychophysics 
(e.g., Laming, 1997; Parducci, 1965, 1995; Stewart, Brown, & 
Chater, 2005). These principles lead to the hypothesis that it is 
the ordinal relationship among attribute values that is critical 
to predicting choice behavior. Independent motivation for this 
hypothesis comes from fuzzy-trace theory, according to which 
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participants reason using the qualitative gist of the choice, and 
this gist can be relative (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995).
The decision-by-sampling model (Stewart, Chater, & 
Brown, 2006; Stewart & Simpson, 2008) provides a mecha-
nism for the evaluation of attributes. The subjective value 
of a particular target attribute value is given by its rank posi-
tion within a sample of attribute values held in memory. The 
sample is assumed to comprise both attribute values from the 
immediate external context and attribute values retrieved 
from memories of previous experiences. The subjective value 
is simply the proportion of pair-wise comparisons with the 
sample in which the target attribute appears favorable. For 
example, the subjective value of $12 might be compared 
against other amounts on offer—say, $5 and $20—and against 
recent payments recalled from memory—say, $8 and $35. In 
this example, $12 has a subjective value of .5 (2/4), because 
half of the comparisons make $12 look good (i.e., the com-
parisons with $5 and $8) and half make $12 look bad (i.e., the 
comparisons with $20 and $35). One consequence that we 
exploited in the studies reported in this article is that the sub-
jective difference between two objective attribute values 
depends on the proportion of intermediate values in the con-
text. For example, $10 and $20 will seem more different if the 
context is $13, $15, $18, and $19 than if the context is $3, $6, 
$25, and $30.
At the population level, Stewart et al. (2006) showed that 
the shapes of the psychoeconomic functions for money, risk, 
and delay—a concave utility function for gains and a convex 
function for losses, an inverse-S-shaped probability weighting 
function, and a hyperbolic delay-discounting function—can 
be derived from this simple idea proposed by the decision-by-
sampling model if it is assumed that attribute values in the 
decision sample are representative of the real-world distribu-
tions of gains, losses, risks, and delays. Brown, Gardner, 
Oswald, and Qian (2008) showed that the rank position of 
one’s wage within the real-world distributions of wages from 
the same employer is a better predictor of wage satisfaction 
than is the absolute size of the wage. Olivola and Sagara 
(2009) found that real-world distributions of death tolls from 
disasters in different countries predict cross-national differ-
ences in risk preferences for decisions with consequences for 
human fatalities. In these examples, subjective values emerge 
from comparisons of attributes with samples from real-world 
attribute distributions.
We tested whether the variation in distributions of attribute 
values between individuals in everyday life can be used to 
account for differences in choice behavior. Such a finding 
would provide strong evidence that sampling from everyday 
experience plays a major role in people’s routine valuation of 
money, risk, and delay. We present four studies in which the 
subjective values of monetary amounts were affected by prices 
sampled from a recent supermarket visit (Studies 1a and 1b), 
the subjective values of probabilities were affected by sam-
pling likelihood expressions from a recent conversational 
exchange (Study 2), and the subjective values of delays were 
affected by a recently considered future event (Study 3). All 
the studies followed the same basic design. In an initial stage, 
people experienced a sample of attribute values. In a second 
stage, they chose between two options designed to reveal dif-
ferences in the subjective values of attributes caused by the 
initial samples.
Study 1a: The Supermarket
The receipt a customer receives when leaving a supermarket 
provides an approximation of the sample of monetary amounts 
he or she has encountered recently, and this sample is quite 
likely still to be available in memory. We offered customers 
leaving a supermarket the opportunity to swap their receipt for 
the opportunity to choose one of two lotteries: one risky lot-
tery with a small probability of a large prize and one safe lot-
tery with a large probability of a small prize. We hypothesized 
that the prizes in the two lotteries would be evaluated by a 
customer in the context of the sample of items on that cus-
tomer’s receipt. Specifically, we expected more participants to 
choose the risky lottery when more of the values listed on the 
receipt fell between the small and large prizes. The more inter-
mediate items there were, the greater the subjective difference 
between the prizes would be. Thus, having more intermediate 
items would increase the attractiveness of the larger-prize lot-
tery relative to the smaller-prize lottery.
Method
Stimuli. Prior to the main study, we collected bags of dis-
carded receipts from the University of Warwick supermarket 
on different weekdays at different times to obtain a representa-
tive sample of receipts. A total of 400 receipts sampled from 
the thousands of receipts in the bags provided 1,082 item 
prices. The interquartile range containing the center 50% of 
the distribution of prices lay between the boundaries of 
approximately £0.50 and £1.50. These boundaries were used 
to create two critical lotteries for the main study. The smaller 
amount was combined with a high probability to create a safe 
lottery (55% chance of winning £0.50), and the larger amount 
was combined with a small probability to create a risky lottery 
(15% chance of winning £1.50).
The lotteries were played by allowing participants to draw 
a poker chip from one of two urns, each containing 100 poker 
chips of two different colors. The safe-lottery urn contained 
55 green poker chips worth £0.50 and 45 other poker chips 
worth £0. The risky-lottery urn contained 15 green poker chips 
worth £1.50 and 85 other poker chips worth £0.
Participants and procedure. We recruited 180 customers 
leaving the supermarket, who agreed to provide us with their 
supermarket receipt in exchange for an opportunity to draw 
a poker chip from one of the two urns (about 75% of all cus-
tomers we asked participated; median age = 20 years; 58% 
male and 42% female; 91% students and 9% staff). First, a 
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participant received a verbal description of the two lotteries 
and was allowed to look inside the urns. The urns were then 
shaken to reshuffle the poker chips before the participant drew 
a chip from the lottery urn of his or her choice. The result of 
the draw was recorded, and the poker chip was returned to the 
urn. Before being paid their earnings, participants were 
required to give some demographic information, including 
age, gender, monthly income, and number of years living in 
the United Kingdom. Both the position of the urns (left or 
right) and the order of their presentation (first or second) were 
alternated randomly across participants.
Results and discussion
For each participant, we calculated the difference in the rela-
tive rank of the two lottery outcomes (£0.50 and £1.50) within 
the sample of prices on his or her receipt. For example, if the 
receipt contained the prices £0.35, £0.79, £0.99, and £1.19, 
the relative rank of £0.50 within this sample would be 1/4, and the 
relative rank of £1.50 would be 4/4; thus, the difference in 
relative rank would be 3/4. A large difference in relative rank 
indicated that a large number of prices on the receipt fell 
between the values of the two lottery outcomes. In contrast, a 
small difference indicated that most of the prices on the receipt 
lay outside (above or below) the range of the two lottery 
outcomes.
Across all participants, there was a slight preference for the 
risky lottery (59%). The mean rank difference between the 
prize values for the two lotteries was .5 (SD = .36). To test our 
hypothesis regarding the relationship between the difference 
in relative rank and the likelihood of choosing the risky lottery, 
we conducted a logistic regression with preference (risky vs. 
safe lottery) as the dependent variable and difference in rela-
tive rank, monthly income, total amount spent, average price 
of the items on the receipt, highest price of the items on the 
receipt, number of items on the receipt, age, gender, and famil-
iarity with the British pound (i.e., years living in the United 
Kingdom) as independent variables. As predicted, we found a 
positive association between the difference in relative rank 
and the probability of choosing the risky lottery, Wald z = 2.90, 
p = .004. Moreover, difference in relative rank was the only 
significant predictor: None of the other variables provided a 
significant increase in model fit (see Table 1). When all values 
were outside the range of £0.50 to £1.50, the probability of 
choosing the risky lottery was .43. When all the prices on the 
receipt were between £0.50 and £1.50 the probability of choos-
ing the risky lottery was .73.
Given that there were no effects of income or receipt total, 
the differences in choice behavior cannot be explained as a 
wealth effect. Further, wealth effects would not discriminate 
between, for example, the cases of purchasing three items at 
£1.00 and purchasing one item at £3.00. Although these two 
cases would result in the same reduction in wealth, they would 
have different effects on the rank difference of the lottery 
prizes: The prizes of £0.50 and £1.50 would be less similar in 
rank in the case of three £1.00 items than in the case of one 
£3.00 item.
Study 1b: Price Experiment
To test whether there was a causal relationship between the 
distribution of experienced prices and the choice participants 
made, we conducted an online experiment using the same lot-
teries and prize values as in Study 1a.
Method
A total of 200 University of Warwick staff members partici-
pated in this study, which was advertised on the University of 
Warwick Intranet. To mimic the shopping experience, we had 
participants judge the value of price-product pairs on a 5-point 
scale (from 1, extremely poor value, to 5, extremely good 
value) and indicate whether they would buy the products. Par-
ticipants were randomly allocated to experience prices either 
below and above the lottery prizes (£0.19 and £3.80) or within 
the range of the lottery prizes (£0.74 and £1.07). Finally, par-
ticipants made the same lottery choice as in Study 1a, with the 
knowledge that all earnings would be donated to charity. To 
minimize the effects of specific products, we presented each 
price with one of four plausible products (randomized across 
participants).
Results and discussion
Participants who were randomly assigned to experience prices 
outside the range of the lottery prizes were more likely to 
choose the safe option (70%) than were participants who expe-
rienced prices within the range (53%), χ2(1, N = 200) = 6.1, 
p = .014. This replicates the finding from Study 1a and demon-
strates a causal link between the distribution of prices experi-
enced and preference for the risky choice. The subjective 
values of objective quantities of money seem to be constructed 
using the relative rank of the target values within the experi-
enced distribution.
Table 1. Inferential Statistics for the Coefficients in the Logistic 
Regression From Study 1a
Coefficient z p
Intercept −0.888 .374
Difference in relative rank 2.904 .004
Income 1.034 .301
Total amount of money spent −0.326 .745
Average price of items on the receipt −0.048 .961
Highest price of items on the receipt 0.483 .629
Number of items on the receipt 0.163 .870
Age 0.760 .447
Years living in the United Kingdom −1.739 .082
Gender 0.960 .337
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Study 2: The Weather
In our next study, we used probability phrases from everyday life 
as the analogue for supermarket prices. We decided to use verbal 
probability expressions, rather than numerical ones, because 
they appear more naturally and more frequently in everyday-life 
communications (Zimmer, 1983). Despite considerable variabil-
ity in interpretations of verbal probability expressions between 
individuals (e.g., Budescu & Wallsten, 1990; Budescu, Weinberg, 
& Wallsten, 1988), probability phrases provide relatively stable 
rank orderings within individuals (e.g., Clarke, Ruffin, Hill, & 
Beamen, 1992; Hakel, 1969), and risky behavior does not depend 
on the mode used to communicate probabilities (e.g., Budescu & 
Wallsten, 1995; Erev & Cohen, 1990).
To obtain self-generated probabilities, we asked people to 
predict the likelihood of rain the next day. We then offered a 
choice between two verbally described lotteries. Congruent 
with the findings of Studies 1a and 1b, our prediction was that 
people with self-generated probabilities below or above the 
two probabilities in the lotteries would be more likely to prefer 
the risky lottery with the larger prize and the lower probability 
because the difference between the probabilities of the two 
lotteries would seem small. In contrast, people with self-
generated probabilities falling between the two lottery proba-
bilities would be more likely to prefer the safe lottery with the 
higher probability and the smaller prize because the difference 
in the probabilities of the two gambles would seem large.
Method
Participants. A total of 401 participants (median age = 42 years; 
59% female and 41% male) completed the 5-min task for the 
chance to win an Amazon.co.uk gift certificate. Participants 
were recruited through a local BBC radio station and its Web site 
and via the University of Warwick’s Twitter stream and Web site. 
Data were collected during September and October of 2009.
Design and procedure. The study was run online via each 
participant’s Web browser. On the first page, participants 
were asked to answer the question, “How likely do you think 
it is to rain tomorrow?” by writing a short sentence using their 
own words. On the second page, participants were offered the 
choice between two lotteries for Amazon.co.uk gift certifi-
cates: “a good chance of winning a prize of £5” and “a small 
chance of winning a prize of £50.” They were informed that 
the chosen lottery would be played for real for a small number 
of randomly selected participants, and their winnings would 
be sent to them by e-mail. After participants selected their 
preferred option, their e-mail address was collected for the 
prize draw.
Results and discussion
Running the study over a 2-month period of varied weather 
with participants living across the United Kingdom meant that 
a large range of phrases was collected. We extracted the 
probability phrase each participant used to describe the likeli-
hood of rain and converted it to a numerical probability using 
tables from the literature on phrases and their corresponding 
mean probabilities (Budescu et al., 1988; Clark et al., 1992; 
Lichtenstein & Newman, 1967; Reagan, Mosteller, & Youtz, 
1989; Stewart et al., 2006). We were able to complete this con-
version for 294 of the 401 participants; idiosyncratic responses 
and responses with no preexisting numerical equivalent were 
discarded. Figure 1 shows the frequency of the different 
phrases, plotted by their mean numerical equivalents. Because 
most of the probability phrases mapped onto a distribution of 
numerical equivalents that was quite broad, we could not with 
certainty categorize phrases as meaning less than “a small 
chance,” more than “a good chance,” or an intermediate likeli-
hood. Instead, we used the numerical equivalent as a continu-
ous predictor of lottery choice.
Of the 294 participants, 60% preferred “a good chance of 
£5,” and 40% preferred “a small chance of £50.” Of most 
interest was the relationship between participants’ estimate 
of the probability of rain and the preferred lottery. Consistent 
with our prediction, a logistic regression model with pre-
ferred lottery as the dependent variable and the numerical 
equivalent of the probability of rain and its square as the 
independent variables revealed a significant quadratic com-
ponent, χ2(1, N = 294) = 10.04, p = .0015, indicating a non-
linear relationship between the numerical equivalent of the 
probability of rain and the log odds of the probability of 
choosing the riskier lottery.
Because a significant curvature could be consistent 
with patterns other than the U shape we predicted (e.g., an 
L shape), we split the data at the median numerical equivalent 
(50%) and performed two separate logistic regressions, each 
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Fig. 1. Frequencies of the different probability phrases used by participants 
in Study 2, plotted by their mean numerical equivalents.
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with lottery choice as the dependent variable and the numeri-
cal equivalent of the probability of rain as the independent 
variable. (Data with a 50% numerical equivalent were dis-
carded, but including the data in either regression did not alter 
the pattern of results.) The line segments in Figure 2 illustrate 
the results. For numerical equivalents less than 50%, there 
was a negative relationship between preference for the risky 
lottery and numerical equivalent of the probability of rain 
(coefficient = −0.026, z = −1.35, p = .17), with higher numeri-
cal equivalents associated with a lower probability of choos-
ing the risky lottery. For numerical equivalents greater than 
50%, there was a positive relationship between preference for 
the risky lottery and numerical equivalent of the probability 
of rain (coefficient = 0.040, z = 2.35, p = .0190), with higher 
numerical equivalents associated with a higher probability of 
choosing the risky lottery. These two coefficients were sig-
nificantly different, z = 2.57, p = .0102. That is, when the 
estimated probability of rain was most likely to be less than “a 
small chance” or greater than “a good chance,” participants 
were most likely to select “a small chance of £50.” When the 
estimated probability of rain was most likely to be in between 
“a small chance” and “a good chance,” people were least 
likely to select “a small chance of £50.” This study therefore 
replicated the effect observed in the supermarket study, show-
ing that, like outcomes, self-generated probabilities can alter 
preferences in risky choice.
Study 3: Birthday Plans
In Study 3, we investigated whether rank-dependent choice 
phenomena could also be observed in the domain of intertem-
poral choice. We tested whether thinking about an event occur-
ring some time in the future (the participant’s birthday) would 
affect preferences in a subsequent choice between a smaller, 
sooner amount (shorter delay) and a later, larger amount (lon-
ger delay). We predicted that participants with birthdays fall-
ing between the shorter and longer delays would perceive the 
delays as more different and therefore show a shift in prefer-
ence toward the smaller, sooner option. Conversely, we 
expected that having a birthday falling before the shorter delay 
or after the longer delay would make the delays appear less 
different, resulting in smaller levels of discounting.
Method
Participants. A total of 75 unpaid participants, almost all Uni-
versity College London applicants who were 17 or 18 years 
old (80% female and 20% male), completed the 5-min task.
Design and procedure. The study was run in a Web browser 
while participants sat at individual computers in a large room. 
An instructions page informed participants that they would 
have to make a series of choices between smaller, sooner and 
larger, later sums of money. Participants were then asked to 
think about their next birthday and what they planned to do to 
celebrate it. They had to rank six options for celebrating their 
birthday (from having a big party to ignoring it) in order of 
likelihood using radio buttons displayed to the right of each 
option.
Immediately following this ranking task, participants com-
pleted a delay-discounting task, through which we determined 
the value at which participants were indifferent between the 
smaller, sooner and larger, later sums (the indifference point). 
They were initially presented with two buttons: The button on 
the left was labeled “£75 in three months,” and the button on 
the right was labeled “£100 in nine months.” Participants were 
asked to select which option they preferred. Next, a standard 
adjusting-immediate-amounts procedure was used to deter-
mine the approximate smaller, sooner sum of money that was 
valued the same as the fixed larger, later sum. The later, larger 
sum was held constant throughout the task. For example, if on 
the first trial a participant chose £75 in 3 months, the smaller, 
sooner sum for the next trial would be set at halfway between 
the smallest possible value that the indifference point could 
take (£0) and the highest possible value it could take (£75), in 
this case, £38 (rounded to the nearest integer). On the next trial, 
if the participant chose the larger, later sum, the smaller, sooner 
sum would be set at halfway between £38 and £75 (£57). On 
the other hand, if on the first trial, the participant chose £100 in 
9 months, the smaller, sooner amount was increased to halfway 
between the current smaller, sooner sum (i.e., £75) and the 
larger, later sum (i.e., £100), meaning the next trial would be a 
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Fig. 2. Results of Study 2: predicted probability of a risky choice as a function 
of the numerical equivalent of the phrase used to describe the probability of 
rain. The U-shaped curve plots the predictions for a logistic regression model 
with numerical equivalent and its square as predictors. The two straight lines 
plot the predictions of two separate logistic regression models predicting 
the probability of a risky choice from numerical equivalents less than 50% 
and from numerical equivalents greater than 50%. The dashed vertical lines 
indicate the numerical equivalents for the probability phrases corresponding 
to the chances of winning the lotteries.
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choice between £88 in 3 months and £100 in 9 months. This 
means that indifference points were bounded by £0 and £100. 
This continued for four trials, and a participant’s indifference 
point was recorded as the midpoint between the lowest and 
highest possible values that the indifference point could take 
after the fourth trial. At the end of the discounting task, partici-
pants were asked to provide their date of birth.
Results and discussion
Participants whose birthday came within the next 3 months 
(n = 17) had a mean indifference point of £77.38 (SD = £19.24). 
In other words, £100 in 9 months was rated approximately the 
same as £77.38 in 3 months, on average. Participants whose 
birthday was more than 9 months away (n = 19) had a mean 
indifference point of £70.13 (SD = £21.70). Crucially, partici-
pants whose birthday lay between 3 months and 9 months 
away (n = 39) showed higher levels of discounting over the 
period, having a mean indifference point of £57.70 (SD = 
£21.04). To examine this effect statistically, we compared the 
indifference points between two groups: participants whose 
birthday was between 3 and 9 months away and those whose 
birthday was not between 3 and 9 months away. There was a 
significant difference in the average indifference point between 
the two groups, t(73) = 3.29, p = .002. This effect was not 
moderated by participants’ preferences for birthday plans.
These results indicate that rank-dependent evaluation of alter-
natives using information from the immediate context is not a 
phenomenon restricted to decisions under risk. Instead, this phe-
nomenon is found in decisions involving delays as well, such 
that rank-dependent evaluations based on information from the 
immediate context affect preferences in intertemporal choice.
General Discussion
Recently experienced prices, likelihoods, and plans altered 
people’s risk and intertemporal preferences. Traditional mod-
els, which assume stable psychoeconomic functions and dis-
card contextual information, cannot explain these results. At a 
minimum, one must assume that there are unstable functions 
that vary from context to context. Incorporating this instability 
into the models will undermine the descriptive power of these 
otherwise simple models because one must also specify a 
context-contingent mechanism to determine the shape of the 
psychoeconomic function in each context. As sampled attri-
bute values were peripheral to the tasks used in our studies and 
were not part of the choice set, even models of context effects 
caused by altering the choice set (e.g., Roe, Busemeyer, & 
Townsend, 2001; Usher & McClelland, 2004) do not predict 
the results without modification.
We distinguish these effects from anchoring (for a recent 
review, see Wegener, Petty, Blankenship, & Detweiler-Bedell, 
2010), which predicts effects opposite to the ones we observed. 
For example, if representations of the target values are anchored 
on intermediate amounts, this should make the targets more 
similar to each other and not more different. Instead, we take 
our results as evidence that the subjective values of objective 
quantities of money, risks, and delays are not stable but are 
instead derived on-line by counting favorable comparisons 
with a sample of attribute values from the immediate context 
and, more generally, from memory.
We found consistent attribute-value-distribution effects for 
a variety of attributes (i.e., money, risk, and delay). Given the 
ubiquity of contextual effects in perception (Laming, 1997) and 
of range-frequency effects in judgment, we predict that all 
magnitudes (e.g., iPod capacity, CO2 emissions, and a food’s 
fat content) will be processed in the same way and will there-
fore be subject to these contextual effects. Formal economic 
framing or other calculation may override this processing, but 
we propose that rank-based processing is a natural default. 
Models built on the sampling hypothesis (e.g., the decision-by-
sampling model; Stewart et al., 2006) provide new opportuni-
ties to model individual differences in choice behavior and its 
instability over time, which have often been neglected as noise.
Of course, because people’s supermarket experience, birth-
days, and belief about the weather were not randomly assigned 
in Studies 1a, 2, and 3, the relationship between the sample 
and the choice in any of these studies could have been caused 
by a common underlying variable. However, it is hard to think 
of a common underlying variable that would explain the 
results for all three studies simultaneously, and it is especially 
hard to think of an underlying variable that would explain the 
nonlinear relationship. Further, participants were randomly 
assigned to different experiences in Study 1b, which provided 
evidence for a causal link (see also Stewart, 2009; Stewart 
et al., 2003; Stewart, Reimers, & Harris, 2010).
Conclusion
Prices sampled from a supermarket affected subsequent pref-
erences for risky lotteries. Thinking about the likelihood of 
rain, a common British activity, affected subsequent prefer-
ences for lotteries for Amazon.co.uk gift certificates. Consid-
ering birthday plans affected subsequent preferences for 
delayed rewards. One possible conclusion from these results 
would be that in order to determine true underlying subjective 
values of monetary amounts, risks, and delays, one should be 
careful to avoid testing participants who have recently used 
money, talked about risks, or planned for the future. But these 
data are consistent with a more radical possibility: Perhaps 
there are no underlying psychoeconomic functions providing 
stable translations between attribute values and their subjec-
tive equivalents. Instead, perhaps subjective values are entirely 
constructed from a comparison with the ever-changing sample 
of attribute values in memory.
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